> For the complete documentation index, see [llms.txt](https://metalife-1.gitbook.io/metalife/llms.txt). Markdown versions of documentation pages are available by appending `.md` to page URLs; this page is available as [Markdown](https://metalife-1.gitbook.io/metalife/metaverse/activities/social-dynamics.md).

# Social Dynamics

1. Players socialize with other players to grow skills.
   1. As they socialize more (with success). This allows players to accomplish more than they normally could.
2. Players form [Relationships](/metalife/metaverse/relationships.md) while in the Metaverse.
3. Friend Or Foe
   1. Players play a game with each other.
   2. After several games, they learn
   3. Game Theory

## Game Theory

Some mini-games will have competitive and cooperative elements to them. One example is the mini-game in the works called love wars (more on this later). An element to this game is to decide at the end of the triva game is to cooperate or defect. In essence, this is the Nash Equilibrium. It only happens directly at the end of the game, after the two players went through the full game.

![Nash Equilibrium](https://2183226448-files.gitbook.io/~/files/v0/b/gitbook-x-prod.appspot.com/o/spaces%2Ft27bQ9PQxz6CyUisG28y%2Fuploads%2Fgit-blob-32ee36c7028f189755b65b143fb55ced947d2c3d%2Fimage.png?alt=media)

If the player chooses to cooperate, they gain mildly good benefits individually. If one defects while the other doesn't, the player could gain a massive payoff.

### Evolutionary

We will play with the trade-offs players will experience between games. Ultimately, if players play this dynamic throughout multiple games, they'll eventually run and have a **tournaments** model emerge.

The payoff players get from a cooperation/competitive decision-making process will make it so players will lean one way or the other. Primarily towards cooperation. We will play with these dynamics to make it so the player will be heavily incentivized to defect over time.

#### Strategy

| Name            | Description                                                                                                                                                  |
| --------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
| **Nice**        | The strategies that do well cooperate during the first round, and generally cooperate as often as they defect in subsequent rounds.                          |
| **Retaliating** | Strategies that cooperate all the time did not do as well as strategies that retaliate if the opponent defects.                                              |
| **Forgiving**   | But strategies that were too vindictive tended to punish themselves as well as their opponents.                                                              |
| **Non-envious** | Some of the most successful strategies seldom outscore their opponents; they are successful because they do well enough against a wide variety of opponents. |

We don't have to code these rules in, but by having some games act as a repeated nash equilibrium, this formation will occur. In the process, players will vary their level of cooperation with each other over the game.